




# Speculative Ideas

On the probable Consequences of an

## I N V A S I O N,

ON OUR LATE

## E N C A M P M E N T S,

And on the State of some of the

## SEA-PORTS in ENGLAND, &c.

I N

## A LETTER to the EARL of *PEMBROKE*.

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By an OFFICER in the ARMY.

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This little Work has been examined and approved by  
Officers, who stand high in the opinion of the Army for  
their Military Knowledge and Experience.

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L O N D O N:

Printed for T. EGERTON (Successor to Mr. MILLAN)  
No. 32, opposite the *Admiralty, Charing-Cross*.

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M,DCC,LXXXII.



Speculative Ideas

On the part of the Government

IN V A S I O N

ON THE PART

IN CAMP M E N T S



SEA-PORTS AND RIVERS

ATTENTION TO THE

OFFICE OF THE

OF THE

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## P R E F A C E.

THE Author has till now suspended the publication of his thoughts, expressed in the following Tract, on the consequences of an Invasion, from an idea that it might contain matter that would convey improper information; but having seen Officers of distinguished rank in the *French* service, in *England*, visiting our Camps, &c. &c. and the public Papers having given a perfect detail of them, he does not conceive that any ill can result from his submitting to the consideration of those whom it now concerns, the imperfect state of defence in which this Kingdom has been suffered to remain at a crisis of extreme danger.

He is persuaded, it will appear that he is not actuated by Party Spirit; and that he only wishes to see the Country put in such a posture of defence as our present situation

(encom-



(encompassed as we are with Enemies) requires.

The Reader will bear in mind, that these Observations were made in the year 1779; and will therefore suppose, after the uncommon exertions which have every where been since made to put this Country in a state of defence, that we are not now exactly in the situation here described.

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TO THE  
EARL of PEMBROKE.

MY LORD,

HAVING, from a very early period in life, been accustomed to reflect on the positions, in every country I have served in or travelled through, proper for Offensive or Defensive Camps, and having, at this alarming period of public danger, taken a view of the greater part of the Coast of *England*, and the ground in the neighbourhood of *London*; I could not resist an inclination of communicating my ideas of what I thought the Enemy might do, and what I conceived should be done by us for securing the Capital, and the neglected Sea-ports, and preventing any probability of success, were the Enemy to land.

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The high opinion the Army so justly entertains of your Lordship's military abilities, leaves me no choice to whom this ought to be addressed.

Since my design of publishing my thoughts on this subject, I have seen a pamphlet, written by a Mr. *Ll*—, which he calls a Rhapsody on French Politics, and in which (Chap. III.) he speaks of an Invasion and its consequences; condemning the present arrangement of the Army destined for the protection of this Country, and recommending certain positions more calculated and better adapted, in his idea, to oppose the Invaders. Few people have seen this book. I have however read it, and with much attention; and have taken the liberty to copy a few passages from it, and to give my comments upon them. Some things he recommends appear extremely proper, others unnecessary: some of his Camps are properly situated, and some are not.—He says, that *Plymouth* would be the object of the Enemy; and that after mastering it they would endeavour to penetrate into the Country, and take post so as to enable them to cover *Plymouth*, and procure provisions for their Army. Here I differ from him; for, although *Plymouth* would in my opinion be the place they would first attempt, yet, with an Army of thirty or forty thousand Men, I am inclined to believe the Capital would be their aim; and a partial landing near *Plymouth* would be only a feint, to draw our Forces to the West of *England*.

Mr.

Mr. *LL*— has prefaced his remarks on Invasions with these words. “ While the terrors of an Invasion hang over our heads, it is the duty of every Man to contribute with his advice to the support of the State, and point out the means which appear to him probable to defeat the designs of the Enemy.” This so perfectly coincides with my idea, that I have thought it could not be better expressed. We however cannot expect, that either his advice, or mine, will ever be attended to; but I shall think myself amply rewarded, if your Lordship and some Military Friends agree with me in a few things, which appeared to me necessary to be done for the security of this Country, and to prevent its falling into the hands of the Enemy, should a Landing be effected in force.

While the cloud hung over our heads, and an Invasion was hourly looked for, the Combined Fleets being in sight of our Coast, I visited the two Camps, at *Coxbeath* and *Warley Common*, the Lines at *Chatbam*, and the adjacent Country. On enquiring of such Officers as I supposed best informed, where the stand was to be made if the Enemy should land in *Kent*, I did not find a single Man who could tell where it was even probable: they only informed me they were to be joined, in such a case, by the Militia, &c. from *Warley*; but where to take post, they did not know: they had heard of no Redoubt, no Batteries, lately raised near the great road to *London*, (the turnpike from *Canterbury*): so that, apparently,

the fate of the Metropolis depended on a Battle ; the salvation of this Country, on a Militia, one-third of which had not then been a month under arms \*.

These were the Forces we had to oppose to the best Regiments in the *French* service, commanded by Officers of distinguished merit, and not by Men newly created Soldiers †.

“ Had the Enemy beat our Fleet, they would “ have invaded us,” is the opinion of every one, as well as Mr. L——. Who knows what preparations they had made? If one may judge from current reports of the strength of their Naval and Land Forces, and recollect that last war we landed in *France*, and made wide excursions into their country ; we may presume the *French* capable of doing the same in some parts of *England*, while their Fleet should ride triumphant in the Channel. They have certainly lost an opportunity, which we may hope never to see them regain ; for how many parts of *England* are there, where they might have then  
made

\* A Battalion of the *Yorkshire* Militia marched into camp, with three hundred Recruits that joined them at *York* the day before they received the Route.

† To succeed in all military operations, we must not only have confidence in our strength, but in the Officer commanding. A want of confidence in the Man who leads us to the field, throws a damp on the minds of Men, which neither soothing nor threats can ever overcome. Whether our Generals are possessed of this confidence, is a matter I shall not make the subject of my observations.



made us severely feel the horrors of an Invasion! *Newcastle, Yarmouth, Norwich, Harwich, and Ipswich*, might, with fifteen hundred Men only, have been laid in ashes. When *Sir Charles Hardy* retreated to *Portsmouth*, the *French* might have pursued, and blocked him up at *St. Helen's* with fifty sail of their Line, while their other Ships covered the landing of their Troops.

At *Newcastle* a Naval Officer assured me, that *Paul Jones* might at that time have burnt three hundred sail of Colliers; which perhaps he would have done, if he had not met with *Capt. Pierſon*.

As to *Yarmouth*, there was only a Battalion of the *Cambridgeshire* Militia: This is a Town open on one ſide, with Gates on the other that cannot eaſily be ſhut, and Guns on the rampart which cannot be fired; with a Fort only in a bottom commanded by high ground, within five hundred yards of it.

With reſpect to the City of *Norwich*, it had not a ſingle Man for its protection; ſo that three Battalions could either have laid it in aſhes, or under contribution: it is only twenty miles from the ſea; and in twenty-four hours the buſineſs might have been effected: for there was no conſiderable body of Infantry nearer than *Warley* Common, a hundred miles off, nor Cavalry nearer than *Colcheſter*.

As to *Ipswich*, it would have been a very eaſy conqueſt; for the Cavalry, the only force near, in that incloſed Country could be of but little uſe.

*Landguard*

*Landguard Fort* is no protection to *Harwich*. There was neither Gun nor Man at *Harwich*, which is a safe Harbour, with water sufficient for Line-of-Battle Ships\*.

All the devastation I have mentioned might have been effected with two or three thousand Men. The Enemy certainly had bad intelligence, or they would have attempted it ; for they had an Army of forty thousand Men ready to embark.

But what was there to prevent their landing in force at or near *Plymouth*, with their Fleet at anchor in *Torbay*, while their Frigates and Fifty-gun ships, &c. could have covered their landing? Were there, or are there now, any Batteries erected to prevent an Enemy from anchoring in *Torbay*? With Batteries at *Hope's Nose* on the East, and *Bury-Head* to the West †, no Enemy could anchor at *Torbay*; and these Batteries would be a protection for our own Fleet to retreat to, when the Enemy are superior at sea. The same wind that would render it dangerous for a Fleet to lie in *Torbay*, would oblige the Enemy to quit the Coast, or stand out to sea ;  
which

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\* Lord T. has since made additional Works, which in some respect command the Channel, but will not prevent an Enemy from landing above the Town, when there is not a strong easterly wind.

† Batteries have since been made at or near these places.

which would give our Vessels an opportunity of gaining *Plymouth* or *Portsmouth*.

Having, my Lord, pointed out some of those injuries which the Enemy had in their power to do us by partial Invasions, we will consider what might have been the consequence had they beaten our Fleet, and known what feeble resistance they had to encounter ; although we now hope to see proper measures taken to prevent even a possibility of an Invasion in force, or even a partial one to do us any material hurt, should even our Fleet be beaten, or driven into Port.

I shall attempt to shew, from my own observations, and those of Engineers, what appears highly necessary to be done.

It is more than probable, that the Enemy, seeing no proper precautions taken to secure the Capital, &c. &c. and knowing that our Troops were encamped on ground suitable only for Parades, or convenient only for Reviews, and that the principal Towns in *England* were left unguarded, have principally on these accounts threatened us yearly with Invasions ; which has caused the Country to be put to such immense expence for Camps, &c.

We must, my Lord, for a moment suppose the Enemy to have landed in the West ; no matter where : But, in the situation *Plymouth* was then in, (Mount *Edgcomb*, the key of *Plymouth*, not fortified) it was probable they would have landed at ———, and from thence proceeded and burnt the  
the



the Dock and Store-Houses; which at that time would have been the work only of a few hours.

To prevent the destruction of *Plymouth*, which is now better taken care of, and which is the Right-Hand of *Great-Britain*, it is natural to suppose the whole force of this Country would be immediately employed, the Camps on *Coxbeath* and *Warley* Common marched, and every Corps in the Kingdom put in motion; as thus, by a rapid movement of our Troops, *Plymouth* might be saved. But when the Enemy were off the Coast, no precaution, that would have been effectual for its safety, could have been taken in time, had the Enemy landed. Of this Sir *David Lindsay*, who commanded, was so very sensible, that after having repeatedly applied for assistance adequate to the defence, and not being able to obtain it, he desired the Commander in Chief to get him removed from his Command; for he did not chuse to be any longer the Officer responsible for the most important Town in *England*, and that not in a state of defence, nor in any respect tenable against the force with which it was then threatened. The additional Fortification made at *Plymouth*, and the repair of the Old Works, plainly shew that Sir *David Lindsay* acted like an experienced Officer.

*Plymouth*, in its present state, with a powerful Garrison, and an Army in the neighbourhood, might not soon fall into the hands of the Enemy; but, if left to the defence of a Garrison only, we  
should

should find the temporary Fortification insufficient to withstand a regular Siege.

Without entering into a detail of what we ought to do, or what the Enemy unmolested *would* do at *Plymouth*, I will venture to say, that with forty thousand Men embarked, they would not make *Plymouth*, after the precautions which we have taken, their main object; but, as I have before observed, they would land there, and that merely to draw our Forces to the West of *England*; their Ships covering their landing, and securing a safe retreat when that had been effected. Yet, if an Army did not march to the relief of the place, they would certainly take it; nor could an unarmed rabble, that might be mustered in that part of the Country, retard the operations of a Siege. Besides, we do not find that the People in the adjacent Counties were intrusted with Arms, even when the Enemy were in fight, and repeated applications were made to Government for them.

The taking of *Plymouth* would certainly repay the Enemy amply for the expence of their Expedition, even if they could not attempt any thing else where with a probability of success. We must not suppose, from our having no plan in which *finesse*, or what is called Generalship, appears, that the Enemy will have none. I say, my Lord, we must not suppose that the Enemy have no Generals; and that they are incapable of Military Stratagem: we must, on the contrary, conclude they have able

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Officers;

Officers ; we must conceive that they see with our eyes ; and must take it for granted, that they are perfectly well acquainted with our force and situation, *if not with the destination* of all the Troops in this Kingdom. We ought to suppose them capable of conceiving, as I fear they are capable of executing, Plans of the highest importance, against which it behoves us to guard in time.

Permit me again to repeat it, that *Plymouth*, had they forty thousand Men embarked, would not be the grand object of such an Army ; and to presume, that as soon as the greatest part of our Troops were in the West to obstruct the Siege, they would immediately sail for the *Thames* ; and before we could get back, if the wind was favourable, they might be at *London-Bridge* ; so that the salvation of this Country would then depend on a foul, or an unfavourable wind \*.

Let me suppose now what the Enemy would do, having landed, in the neighbourhood of *Plymouth*,  
under

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\* The Author has been asked, but by young and unexperienced Officers, how it would be possible for a large Army to re-embark without considerable loss ? “ Remember, they say, “ the affair of *St. Cas.*” Had proper steps been taken, that disaster would never have happened. Had Gen. *Blyth* any works to cover a re-embarkation ? What loss did Gen. *Washington* sustain, in his retreat from *Long Island*, with 12,000 beaten Troops, and in the face of a victorious Army ? or what loss did the Rebels sustain on *Rhode Island* in a similar situation ?



under the guns of their Ships, such part of their Army as they should think necessary, and having thrown up Works to cover their retreat. Intelligence of the state of *Plymouth* would be the first object of an invading Enemy; and there is no Country but affords Spies: every Smuggler is a Spy, who would give them the information they most wanted, viz. What was the strength of the Garrison; what Bodies of Troops were assembled and assembling at and in the neighbourhood of *Exeter*. When the Enemy had found that our Troops were every where in motion against them, and that *Plymouth* was not to be taken without a Siege, and consequently that it would be a work of time, they would wait only for a favourable wind to bring them up the Channel; they would then re-embark, with the loss, perhaps, of a few Cannon left spiked in the Works that covered their retreat; would immediately weigh anchor, and sail for the *Downs*; and, the wind remaining fair, they would not drop anchor again till within two miles of *Gravesend*, leaving us and the greater part of our Army in the West.

From some conversation I have had with Naval Officers, I have learnt that a moderate gale, and a tolerably fair wind, blowing from any point in either the South or West quarters, would bring a Fleet into the *Downs* in two days; in one tide they would be up at *Gravesend*; and before intelligence could reach our Army, and they could possibly arrive, it is to be feared the fatal blow would be struck.

To guard against this supposed evil (which in this Metropolis would be felt, by all ranks of People, as an earthquake ready to shake this Government to its foundation), I shall endeavour to shew what I conceive would effectually prevent it.

How chimerical soever my ideas may appear to some, I am not singular in believing, that the Capital would be the main object of the Enemy, with an Army of thirty thousand Men. Many Officers are of the same opinion.

That Government feared the Enemy's coming up the *Thames* in the summer of 1779, is evident; or why did they send Vessels, and station them at the *Nore*, to cut away the Buoys, should the Enemy's Fleet appear in fight?

What has been an argument, with Men not acquainted with Naval Operations, is, that an Enemy would not be able to explore the Channel, if the Buoys were cut away \*. I admit, that in a gale of  
wind,

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\* For the information of those who cannot conceive how a Fleet can get up the River when the Buoys are cut, they must know that Light Vessels, with Smugglers, or other intelligent Men, on board, would drop Buoys on each side the Channel, a-head of the Fleet, faster than the Fleet with a light breeze could sail; and, if detained a tide, Boats would row up, and mark the Channel. In crossing *Lake St. Peter's* in *Canada*, the Fleet lay-to, to explore the passage. The Rebels having cut away the Buoys, this took up half an hour. Boats were sent out, and anchored on each side until the Fleet had passed.

wind, and no Pilot on board, a Vessel would probably be lost: but in the summer season violent gales seldom happen.

To pursue my speculative idea of the Enemy's designs *consistently with possibilities*, I shall suppose the Enemy's Fleet in the River, and the chief Force of this Country in the West of *England*. I need not describe the consternation such an event would occasion in the streets of *London*; it were indeed easier to conceive than to paint the horrors it would excite.

The Enemy would proceed as far up the River, as two miles below *Gravesend*; and the first step they would take, would be to land their Army under the guns of their Ships, and that with all possible expedition \*.

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The morning the Rebels quitted *Ticonderago*, two Twenty-gun Vessels pursued the Enemy's batteaus, &c. eighteen miles up *South Bay*, where no such Vessels had ever been, without any Pilot that knew the depth of water on board; each Vessel going before the wind with all her sails set, heaving the lead as they proceeded. Lord *Howe's* Fleet did the same up the *Delawar* and *Cheapeake Bay*.

\* We know that the *Dutch* Fleet, in the year 1667, came up the River, with twenty Sail of the Line, and burnt our Ships in the *Medway*. The River is now in much the same state, and the impediments not greater. If they had had an Army of forty thousand Men on board, would they have attempted nothing else? Doubtless they would at that time have marched into *London*.



The Enemy, I have been frequently told, could not pass *Tilbury* Fort; for there is a Battery at *Gravesend* of 26 twentyfour-pounders, directly opposite the Fort, which would sink every Vessel that attempted to pass. The Battery I have seen. The Enemy, perhaps, would not so risque their Vessels as to bring-to between the Fort and Battery, though the danger would not lie there; for our guns, if then fired, from either side, (it being only eight hundred yards distance from shore to shore) would be as injurious to ourselves as our Enemies: but, with a tide and leading wind, a vessel would soon be a-breast of the Fort; and the upper-deck guns of a Line-of-Battle Ship would be above, and entirely command, both the Battery and Fort; and when a hundred yards above the Fort, not a gun from the Battery, and scarcely one from the Fort, could be brought to bear on the Vessel. But the Enemy would have no occasion to do this; it would be taking the bull by the horns; and they are too wise to run unnecessary risques\*. They would land their Army, as I have observed before, and instantly take possession of the Battery at *Gravesend*, there being no obstacle whatever to oppose them †.

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\* Our Navy-bought their experience sufficiently dear to teach them better, both at the *Havannah*, and since at *Charles Town*, where Sir *Peter Parker* brought up Frigates to attack batteries in which were twentyfour-pounders.

† Can we for a moment believe, that the Enemy are ignorant

They would then be in possession of the *Key of London*; and more than one Engineer, with whom I have conversed on the subject, are of the same opinion; for, this Battery at *Gravesend* once in the hands of the Enemy, *Tilbury Fort* is then in an hour beat to pieces, or blown up, \* and the passage opened for the Enemy's Fleet, even to *London Bridge*. It is an inconceivably strange neglect, to let this important Battery remain in the situation it was in last summer, when there were only two or three Guns in it, and not a single Artillery-man on the spot.

The Enemy would be glad to find this Battery ready constructed; for such a Battery they would be obliged to make for the destruction of the Fort,  
if

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rant of this shameful neglect, when Foreigners and Spies are daily passing and repassing to and from the Continent?

\* Two-Line-of Battle Ships, whilst the Fort remained in the condition I saw it in, would in half an hour have silenced every Gun, on account of the want of Men there, and the unfinished state of the New Works. In June, 1780, it was nearly in the same situation. A Naval Officer then assured me, that two Men of War could have sailed up to *London Bridge*, and destroyed every vessel in the River. Of how little consequence to the Enemy would the loss of two Ships have been, in comparison of the injury this Country would have sustained! Let any one picture to himself what would have been the distress of this Town under such a calamity; what would have been the miserable situation to which it would have been reduced,

if they thought it expedient to bring their Fleet higher up the River before they risked an Action. The success of the Enemy's enterprise, from first to last, would depend on expedition ; of which they must be sensible, and would consequently push for the Capital, that we might not have time to draw from the West our Troops assembled there, or be able to collect a Force sufficient to check them. Where the Enemy would halt, is easily to be conceived.

Having examined with some attention the Country in the neighbourhood of *Gravesend*, I find not only that the ground there is strong, but that it seems by nature formed for an Entrenched Camp, with the left to the Town of *Gravesend*, and the right on the high ground extending towards *Southfleet* and *Hartley*. This appears to me the natural, proper, and only Line of Defence that can be made for the security of the City of *London*. The hand of Providence has been partial to us, in forming the Features of this particular part of *Kent*. An Action in any part of this County might be risked, if we had such a Camp to retire to, in case of a defeat ;

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reduced, had the Enemy for three months been masters of the Navigation of the *Thames* ! To instance only in one particular, whence could the City have been supplied with that indispensable article, Fuel ?



defeat ; but, as we are now circumstanced, the Enemy would fight us every where to great advantage. If they were beaten, they have their Ships to retreat to, which in the *Thames* would be as great a security to them, as if they were to retire under the walls of a Fortified Town. But our Troops, if defeated in the Field, would not have a breathing-place till they reached the Streets of *London* ; no spot to retire to, in which they could have confidence ; no Works, under the Guns of which Troops might be rallied : A reflection very alarming—I do not say, to the Man of Military Experience only, but—to the Man of mere Common Sense !

Five Redoubts will be sufficient, with 12,000 Men properly posted in and between them, to render that ground equal to 30,000 Assailants. The left may be made impregnable : the Hill, on which stands a Mill, may be fortified at little expence, and would not only be a security to the left flank of the Camp, but a protection to the Battery in the Town of *Gravesend*. The Enemy, when landed, would not venture to quit the River, to make a *détour* into the Country, and attack our right Flank\*. Let it be remarked, further, that five Redoubts, capable of containing ten twelve-

D pounders

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\* No one can say we have yet any Barrier formed to stop the progress of an Invading Army. This, however, is surely an object of such magnitude, that every other consideration should give place to it.

pounders each, and calculated to answer so important an end, would not cost Government 20,000 l.\*

The Enemy we have supposed, on this speculative idea, just landed under the cannon of their Shipping : we will go farther than to imagine our General capable of falling into the snare of sending all our Force to the West, for the protection of *Plymouth*. Yet, will any Officer tell me, that twenty thousand Men will prevent forty thousand from landing on the Flat Ground below *Gravesend*? Certainly not ; nor even five thousand from landing, and re-embarking when they please, under their own cannon. Suppose the whole Force at *Cox-beath*. Would you, then, remove that Force, and leave *Chatham* exposed? Let any Officer look at the ground

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\* Were the Merchants of *London* made sensible of the necessity of this Barrier being formed, and constantly kept up during a War ; and were they convinced that it is to good fortune they owe their escape from the imminent danger to which the neglect of such means of defence had exposed them ; they would, even within the hour, subscribe 100,000 l. for so national, so essential a purpose. If it were not to degrade my subject, I might, in allusion to the Fable, say, that we have hitherto been, with regard to our Enemies, in the situation of the Boy and the Peasants with respect to the Wolf. We have, as yet, indeed, been only terrified : the Wolf, however, may come at last.—*London*, in its present state, may be compared to a Ship in a gale of wind, riding with one Anchor, which being gone, all would be lost !—If our army were once beaten, ruin must follow ; especially if the fatal blow were given within thirty miles of the Metropolis !

ground on the *London* side of that place, and see if it may not be laid in ashes in a few hours from that side of the River.

The Enemy would immediately bring you to Action ; an event you could not avoid, unless you gave up the Battery at *Gravesend*, and consequently the passage of the River ; which would be extreme madness, or extreme ignorance ; for the Enemy might then send Line-of-Battle and Fire-Ships even up to *London* Bridge, and divide your Force by landing a part of their Army above *Gravesend*, on the *Essex* side of the River. But our Generals would dispute the ground here described : this they would fortify with all possible dispatch ; and the fate of this Country at that hour would depend on a single Battle !

But, my Lord, to humour those who will insist upon the impossibility of an Enemy's approaching *London*, on the South side of the *Thames*, granting our Forces to be thirty thousand ; I may admit the fact. But let me ask those Gentlemen, What is there to prevent the Enemy's landing, and marching by the Village of *Tilbury*, and leaving you on the high ground at *Gravesend* ? for there is a weakness in this quarter, which I have not yet taken notice of, though I have been often down to examine it.

The Enemy, landing on the other side, would immediately gain the New Road (the road of communication for the Camps) and by that means se-



cure the great Turnpike-Road to *London*, and carry their point that way ; or they could take such position, with twenty thousand Men, that you would not dare to attack them : they could there wait for their whole Army, and give you Battle ; which you could not, for the security of the Capital, avoid.

Your Army, in that case, could not march round in less than two days ; for they could not pass the *Thames* at *Gravesend*, but would have a march of above forty miles through *London*, to meet the Enemy coming from *Warley*, or that part of *Essex* ; nor could you march the whole of your Army, and leave the high ground at *Gravesend* to be taken possession of by the Enemy.

The County of *Essex* is strong : the soil, in the part I am speaking of, is a deep clay ; the ditches are wide, the hedge-rows thick, and inclosures small, with hills covered with wood ; so that twenty thousand Men could in a few hours take a position you would not be able with twice that number to drive them from. They would then cover a country that could furnish them, both their Fleet and Army, with fresh provisions ; and here our heavy Cavalry could be of no consequence \*.

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\* There are few parts of *England* in which Cavalry can act ; though I was once told by a Cavalry Officer, that, wherever Infantry could go, *they* could likewise go, and be of equal use. By this assertion he might have imposed upon  
a young

It was strange to see the Cavalry, at fifty or a hundred miles from the Coast, in large Camps, at the time the Enemy were expected to land, and at the time the Proclamation was issued for driving the Cattle. This was the service to which they might have been put, and in which they would have been of great use, if they had been called upon: Infantry, although assisted by the most active Magistrate, and serving under the most alert Officer, could not have executed orders with that rapidity which the service required of them.

The situation for the Cavalry was certainly that very part of the Coast where it was probable the Enemy would land; and their disposition should have been

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a young Cornet in his Regiment, and given him a high opinion of the use of Cavalry; but, as I have seen them on service, and served with them, he must excuse me for dissenting from him.

Another Cavalry Officer, and one who had seen service too, told me that he was sorry they were removed from a Camp near *Newmarket*, the finest country in the world for Cavalry to act in, and sent to *Colchester*, where he did not see they could be of the least use. Did this Gentleman suppose, the Enemy would seek him on *Newmarket* Heath; when it is in such open countries, only, that Cavalry can be of material service! Our Cavalry are, in truth, the *pageantry*, not the support of this Nation; which every man, but a Cavalry Officer, sees and acknowledges. These Regiments however, are so convenient, in the hands of Ministers, for rewarding useful Votes in Parliament, that we must not expect Government to lessen their number.

been in Camps of single Regiments: but this would not have been convenient for the Reviewing General, or proper for the Commanding Officer to shew his talents for Cavalry Evolutions.

But, not to lead your Lordship too wide a tour from the Scene of Action, we will return to the Field where we supposed the Enemy might be.—To deprive them of the alternative of taking which side of the River they might chuse, a strong Redoubt should be constructed on the Hill east of the Village of *Tilbury*; § in which should be twenty pieces of Cannon; and the Redoubt should be so strong, that the Enemy would not attempt to carry it by storm. This would prevent their passing between the Fort and Village.

Another Security for the *Essex* side of the River, would be, to cut the Banks of the River, and open all the Sluices below *Tilbury*, to overflow the Marshes. The Magistrates should receive orders from the Secretary of State \* to see this performed on the approach of the Enemy's Fleet.

The City of *London* would then, with the Redoubts I have before mentioned, supposing the Works to be perfectly complete and well executed,  
and

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§ In order perfectly to secure this side of the *Thames*, two Redoubts are here necessary.

\* No such orders were issued, for either side of the River, at the time the Enemy were expected up it.



and a proper Force in and between them, be in a state of security, even against all the Powers of *Europe*.

On the other hand, without these Works, during a *French* War, the City of *London* would be in constant danger of being in the hands of the Enemy, if they were once superior at sea.

Your Lordship, taking the trouble to cast your eye over the Plate annexed, will see the utility, as well as the necessity of this Camp being always formed during a War with *France* \*.

The Camps, when these Works are finished, will be as well at *Coxheath* and *Warley*, as any where else.

For the safety of *Chatham*, which is not at present à l'abri, not less than three thousand Men ought to be stationed there, to work at the Lines, which, when complete on the present plan, will, according to appearances, be no security for the Dock-yard. The money this will cost, would have put the whole Kingdom in a state of defence.

It is said, that the Engineer (the Executor) is not the Projector of these extravagantly absurd and expensive Works †.

Supposing

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\* “ *Il y a des Camps, qu'on ne doit occuper que pour un passage; on y prend cependant tous les avantages que la situation peut donner,*” &c.

† The Author begs leave here to quote a few lines from Mr. *Gibbon*, to shew that we are not, in his opinion, in safety, when

Supposing your Lordship to have read Mr. *Ll--*'s book on the projected Invasion, I shall make some remarks

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when a formidable Army is on board Transports, even though they should have no Naval Force to protect them. This Writer, speaking of the Roman Expedition against the Usurpation of *Alecus* in *Britain*, says, "So imperfect, in those times, was the art of Navigation, that Orators have celebrated the daring courage of the *Romans*, who ventured to set sail with a side wind, and on a stormy day. The weather proved favourable to their enterprise: under the cover of a thick fog, they escaped the Fleet of *Alecus*, which had been stationed off the Isle of *Wight* to receive them; landed in safety on some part of the Western Coast, and convinced the *Britons*, that a superiority of Naval strength will *not always* protect their Country from Foreign Invasions."

He then tells us, that the *Roman* General had no sooner disembarked his Troops, than he set fire to his Ships; and, as the expedition proved fortunate, his heroic conduct was universally admired.

"The Usurper had posted himself near *London*, to expect the formidable attack of *Constantius*, who commanded in person the Fleet of *Bologne*; but the descent of the Enemy required his immediate presence *in the West*: he performed this long march in so precipitate a manner, that he encountered the whole Force of the *Roman* General with a small body of harrassed and disheartened Troops. The engagement was soon terminated, by the total defeat, and death of *Alecus*. A single battle, as it has often happened, decided the fate of this Island."

Mr. *Hume*, in his History of England, page 420, says, that in the year 1667, the *Dutch* Fleet appeared in the *Thames*, and threw the *English* into the greatest consternation. A Chain  
had

remarks on his arrangements for Camps, and his opinion of the State of Defence of this Country, &c.

“ Land-Forces,” he says, “ are nothing : Marines are the only species of Troops proper for this Nation ; they alone can defend and protect it effectually.”

I should think, my Lord, that Marching Regiments are just as serviceable on board our ships, and may be put to the same use as Marines ; and I dare say a Battalion of Sir *Henry Clinton's* Army, that has  
been

had been drawn across the *Medway* ; *Sheerness* was soon taken. Having the advantage of a spring tide, and an easterly wind, the *Dutch* pressed on, and broke the Chain, though fortified by some Ships that had been there sunk by order of the Duke of *Albemarle* : they burnt three Ships that lay there to guard the Chain : after damaging several Vessels, they advanced with six Men of War and five Fire-Ships, as far as *Upnor* Castle, where they burnt the *Royal Oak*, the *Loyal London*, and the *Great James*. The *Hollanders* fell down the *Medway*, without receiving any considerable damage ; and it was apprehended they might the next tide sail up the *Thames*, and extend their hostilities even to *London Bridge*.”

*Robertson*, in his History of Scotland, says that “ a War on the borders of that Country exposes *France* to no danger ; but one unsuccessful action there may hazard the Crown, and overturn the Government of *England*.” We all know, that in the year 1745, the Pretender, with an undisciplined Rabble, marched into the heart of this Country ; and, had he been General enough to have pursued his blow after his success at *Preston-Pans*, he would have marched into *London* without farther opposition.



been scowering the woods of *America*, will do as much or more execution than any Body of Marines of the same number : they would certainly be of equal use on the Quarter-Deck ; and Marines are not expected to go aloft. I do not see why Marching Regiments may not upon every occasion be employed as Marines : and Mr. *Ll*— seems to agree in this opinion ; for he says, “ Why are not the new Levies “ converted into Marines ? ” He certainly means, Why are they not employed as Marines ? Again he says : “ A powerful Fleet, and thirty thousand “ Marines, will save us ; and nothing else.”

But, in another place, he adds, “ If we are reduced to *defend* England, all is over.” This in part coincides with my idea ; for forty thousand Men being once landed within thirty miles of *London*, I fear all would be over, in our present State of Defence, or rather defenceless State.

“ Standing Armies,” he says, “ are useless burdens ; and now, to our cost, they will be found “ totally inadequate to the Defence of *England* “ and its Colonies.”

Such a Standing Army as we have, I am convinced, on a day of real conflict, will be found inadequate to our Defence : but it is not too late to remedy this evil ; it is not too late to put the Army on a footing equal to the service now required of them. Our eyes have been opened since the last Peace : we are convinced that Continental Connexions are ruinous, and in direct opposition to the  
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interest of this Country; and a Continental War is the only war that can materially injure us.

The Cavalry are not, therefore, necessary to be kept up *in such* force as we have them: instead of augmenting, we ought to have reduced them. Now is the time to draught one half, and form them into four Battalions of Artillery; *these* are the Troops we want.

Was your Lordship to enquire only into the state of every Garrison in this Kingdom, you would find there is scarcely a Man to a Gun any where. There was only one lame Artillery-man, in *Tinmouth* Fort, at the time *Paul Jones* appeared; and he was sent to teach a Regiment of Militia to work the guns upon carriages without wheels, platforms without frames, &c. and it is indeed much the same in all the Garrisons in *Great Britain*. There are, most certainly, no Troops at this hour so much wanted as Artillery-Men.

The Governors of Garrisons, at twenty shillings per day, are too wise to make representations of the state of the places under their care, or apply for Men or Stores, &c. They know, that to be *troublesome*, is a synonymous term for Opposition; and the Deputy-Governor has his 182l. per annum for his past services.

The new Works necessary to be constructed, for the protection of the first Towns in this Country, as well as those now wanted for Garrison duty, call for an immediate augmentation in the number of

Battalions of Artillery: but, were the Noble Lord at the head of the Army to adopt Mr. Ll——'s idea one year, and mine the next, it would remind us of the fable of the Man and his Son, who attempted to carry the Afs to please the populace. To borrow a once-published idea, is beneath a Commander in Chief. We must not expect to see any change in our present System of Military Arrangement.

“Without confidence,” says Mr. Ll——, “his Majesty cannot avail himself, with any prospect of success, of the National Forces.”—I should presume, he means that we ought to have confidence in the Commander in Chief, and the other Generals on the Staff, that are at the head of the Army; for I know not of any other confidence he can refer to: he cannot intimate any position to be taken; nor any works already constructed for the national security, for there are none\*.

He says, “to increase our distress, the Combined Enemy may land fifteen or twenty thousand Men in the Bay of *Galway*, and cover themselves with the *Shannon*.”—I can scarcely believe Mr. Ll—— has ever been at *Cork*, or he would not land so large an Army where they could do but little mischief.—If the Enemy found they could spare fifteen or twenty thousand Men, they would (if they landed

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\* “*Le vrai mérite d'un Général consiste à bien camper une Armée, la faire marcher, subsister, & le bien conduire, à s'attirer la confiance des Troupes,*” &c.



landed any where in *Ireland*) land them near *Cork*. The Cove is the finest Harbour in the world; and the Town furnishes our Armies in *America* and the *West-Indies* with Provisions; therefore *Cork* would be their object in that Country.\*

But, if the Enemy had such a force as twenty thousand Men to spare, they would land them in the North of *England*, and by that means divide our force at home, which would be of more consequence to their Grand Expedition than landing their Men in *Ireland*.

“The resources of this Country,” he says, “are great, and, when properly exerted, will enable us to overcome our Enemies, however formidable, and force them to lay down their arms:”—that is, if Mr. *Ll*—— will oblige them to penetrate into the Country, and march to *Halldown Hill*, near *Exeter*; which place he points out as a situation where they may take post. But in another place, he tells us, he “fears our contest with the House of *Bourbon* unequal, and wishes to draw a veil over our alarming prospect; that, to our cost, we shall find our Armies inadequate to our defence, &c.”

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\* It behoves us, during a War, to be particularly attentive to this place, and to have a large body of Troops always in the neighbourhood for its protection. The Hills are high and commanding on all sides, and Works may be easily constructed upon them.

“An Army,” he says, “must depart from a given point, and proceed to a given point, in an “Enemy’s Country.”—That given point, in this Country, I should suppose, is *London*. Can your Lordship suppose for a moment, that an Enemy who had taken *Plymouth* would march over the rough part of *Devonshire*, about two hundred and twenty miles, to get to *London*, when, by embarking their Army, they could sail within twenty miles of it? If I had not heard that Mr. *Ll*—— was an Officer who had served, I should, from his ideas on this point, have conceived he had never seen an Army in the Field, or that he was not serious in what he has advanced.

I cannot enter into his idea of the Enemy forming a *dépôt* in this Country; for I shall never believe, that they will think of penetrating far, or ever being out of the reach of their Ships; they will therefore never want any other *dépôt* than their Ships. They will never think of crossing the Channel with less than Three Months Provision. I do not suppose they would winter in this Country: whatever injury they might attempt, it would be done in two months, unless the Capital were in their possession.

Mr. *Ll*—— thinks also, “that the Enemy must “absolutely have a Place of Arms in this Country, “and a safe Harbour.”—The latter they certainly must have; and the *Thames*, or *Harwich* Harbour, I am of opinion, would be their aim, because neither

ther of them is far from the given point, and both are near enough to *France* for them to receive supplies: the shores are low; and their own guns can cover both their landing, and a re-embarkation when necessary.—At *Harwich* the ground is commanding; but there is nothing to annoy them, or to prevent the attempt.

Mr. *Ll*—— informs us, that when a *coup-de-main* only is intended, it depends on secrecy and surprise; and condemns General O'Reily's proceeding at *Algiers*, where, he says, he lost his reputation as an Officer,

The first remark he must certainly have made for the information of the young Ensigns of the Army; and the second only shews that Officers differ in their opinions on most Military Operations; particularly where those who have not been present, take upon them to decide on mere speculative ground.

For my part, I do not think it fair to judge of any unsuccessful enterprise by the event, without having been on the spot; nor even in that case is it justifiable, without having been confidentially in possession of all the information a General may have received.

Next to *Plymouth*, Mr. *Ll*—— thinks “*Portsmouth* is the only place which can serve the purpose of an Invading Enemy.”—“They must,” says he, “occupy *Gosport* with part of their Army, “while the remainder carries on the siege; and, “if we are masters of *Portsmouth*, and can confine  
“them



“them to the Island of *Portsea*, we are always able  
 “to succour the place, and force them to retire,  
 “which they would find no easy matter.” He further says, “The Lines of *Gosport* are of no use;  
 “and those towards *Portsmouth* are against us, if  
 “the Invader is in the Island.”

I agree with Mr. *Ll—*, that the Lines at *Gosport* are of no use; and the Town, in the situation he puts it in, may be supplied and succoured from *Portchester* Castle: but I do not see why the Enemy, masters of the sea, and supposed to have time to carry on a siege, should not be able to throw up Works to cover their retreat, particularly at high-water, and as no commanding ground is in their rear.

A good Fort, which he recommends, in the front of the Lines of *Gosport*, is absolutely necessary: that alone would be the salvation of *Portsmouth*, were an Enemy to land in that quarter. Without this Fort, the Dock-Yards, and great part of the Town, might be destroyed, even if the Enemy did not raise a single Battery on the Island of *Portsea*, but only occupied the Lines towards *Portsmouth*, or, indeed, if they never landed on the Island.

I hope to see Mr. *Ll—*'s advice taken: I think a Redoubt on the Lines against *Portsmouth*, very necessary; it would be a Key to the Island; it would answer the purpose of an Encampment on *Portsmouth*, which, if it did not consist of six or eight thou-

land Men, would be of but little use; whereas two Regiments of Infantry in *Hilsea* Barracks will be sufficient for the Redoubt proposed, with one Regiment of Cavalry on the Island, to drive off the Draught Cattle, &c.

But, in the present situation of this place, the Enemy could effect what they wanted, without dividing their force, by landing the whole at *Stubbington*, and not at *Stoke's Bay*, where the new and useless Battery is made; for no Enemy in their senses will land in the face of a Battery when they can land above or below it, and thereby effect their purpose without risque: and this expedient would be attended with less danger, than dividing their forces.

Mr. *Ll*——'s opinion on the Enemy's taking possession of the Isle of *Wight*, appears to me somewhat extraordinary: he says, that "the mountains are very high to the southern parts of the Island; so that, if any Troops are posted on them, there is no possibility of landing."—He then says, after admitting the Enemy in possession of the Island, that, "if we consider the vast extent of the Island, the great number of high mountains, and of places to land from our side, it will appear that twenty thousand Men would not be able to occupy it in such a manner, as to prevent our taking it from them." We are then to conclude, that twenty thousand Men would not defend it against the Enemy; for he will not oblige the In-

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vaders to land on the South side of the Island, if they are Masters of the Sea, which is always to be implied.

I shall not enter into Mr. *Ll*——'s reasons why the Island cannot be defended with twenty thousand Men: But I am much surpris'd to find such a thing asserted; for I should think, in so strong a Country, with hills so commanding, and where the designs of the Enemy would be so easily seen, that it would be difficult for any force to make a landing good, in the face of twenty thousand Men.

Mr. *Ll*—— recommends a Camp at *Halldown-Hill*, another at *Portsmouth*, and a third in the *New Forest*.

His proposition of a Camp on *Halldown-Hill*, for no other reason but its being so strong a position that neither Flank could be turned, or that it would not be in the power of the Enemy to force it, is as strange an idea as that of encamping the Cavalry on *Newmarket Heath*, or *Salisbury Plains*, because the Country suits them to charge in.—Is it probable that the Enemy will come, complaisantly, where you wish them, or where they know you are prepared to receive them?

But, my Lord, I must confess I have seen a very old Officer fall into this error\*.

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\* I once saw fourteen hundred Men march out, on a Reconnoitring Party, with several pieces of Artillery. After the Troops were posted, the Artillery-Officer said he would then



There is, however, no error, into which a Military Man can fall, so great as that of fancying an Enemy will come where he would wish to have him, unless it be that of attacking an Enemy where he would prefer to be attacked, of which I could give some striking examples, if for certain reasons it were not improper.

A Camp on *Halldown-Hill*, I am of opinion, could answer no one necessary purpose. It is too far from *Plymouth* (thirty-six Miles) for the Troops to be ready to dispute the Enemy's landing. I think the Camp in the West of *England* should be within five miles of *Plymouth*, and should consist of eight thousand Infantry, and one thousand Cavalry; for, although this is a Country the Cavalry cannot charge in, yet they can prevent the Enemy from getting Draught-Cattle, &c.

Mr. *Ll*——'s Camp at *Portsmouth* I do not approve of, as nothing less than six or eight thousand Men can occupy the ground necessary on these heights; which Force cannot be spared. A Fort,

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then bid defiance to all the force the Enemy could bring against him; and he was very right—if they had come in the direction he wished to receive them in: but in about an hour the Enemy appeared, and having examined his position, attacked both his flanks, and were so *awkward* as not to march a single Battalion in the line he wished them to take. The consequence was, the fourteen hundred Men were routed, and the Cannon all lost.

or Redoubt, on the Line at *Hilsea*, as I have before observed, will answer the purpose of such a Camp.

Nor can I see the least probable utility in Mr. *Ll*——'s Camp in the *New Forest*; for, if his advice be taken, to have a good Fort in the front of the Lines at *Gosport*, and a strong Garrison at *Portsmouth*, there will be little mischief to apprehend in this quarter. Nevertheless, I would advise a small Cavalry Camp of Light Horse, within four miles of *Gosport*, for the purpose I have before mentioned.

What follows, for ten pages, in Mr. *Ll*——'s pamphlet, is a minute description of the Country from *Plymouth* to *Halldown-Hill*, which, even from his account of its strength, and the difficulty an Enemy would have to struggle with, I am persuaded, would effectually prevent their ever entangling themselves in it. If to these we add the many artificial impediments they would find, such as broken bridges, and trees cut across the road, which are no small obstacles in an Enemy's Country; and if we consider further that they would have no one object in these parts, but that of obtaining the power, according to Mr. *Ll*——'s idea, of leaving a Garrison of ten thousand Men on Mount *Edgcomb*; we may safely presume they would carry their main Army to another part of *England*, especially as it would be more than probable, great part of the Forces of the Island would be in *Devonshire*,

*Devonshire*, to be a check upon, if not give battle to, the Invaders.

Mr. *Ll*—— then informs us, the *French* have advantages over us, being composed of old Corps, and their Officers Men of high rank, and who have seen service: all which must insure them great probability of success in a general action.

But, in order to keep us in spirits, he tells us that we also possess many advantages, viz.

1st. “The face of the Country will oblige the Enemy to march in a single Line.”—True, if Mr. *Ll*—— will insist upon their landing in a rough mountainous country; but not otherwise.

2d. “They have little Cavalry.”—So much the better for them; they will be the less incumbered. Whoever lands Cavalry in an Enemy’s Country, must expect to lose them: one hundred Men on foot, in *Devonshire*, (Mr. *Ll*——’s Theatre of War) would make a retreat good, and bid defiance to a Regiment of Cavalry.

3d. “The Enemy can have no heavy Artillery.”—Pray, my Lord, had Prince *Ferdinand* any heavy Artillery with his Army? Are heavy Artillery ever wanted in the Field, *unless you have any Works to force, that lie in your way?*

4th. “No Provision, but what they bring with them.”—What Provision had our Army at *Long-Island*, or on their landing in the *Ferseys*, more than they carried with them from their Ships? What had our Army, last war, on the Coast of *France*?

5th. They



5th. "They can never have a sufficient number of Horses, &c."—In this I agree with Mr. *Ll*—, if the Cavalry are disposed of, and employed in the manner I have recommended, in case the Enemy should attempt to penetrate. But, if Mr. *Ll*— fees this, why does he suppose the Enemy will be able to take post on *Halldown-Hill*, with thirty thousand Men? It will be utterly impossible, if our Cavalry prevent their getting Horses, and Draught Cattle. Thirty thousand Men cannot easily march thirty-six miles without Draught Cattle.

6th. "When they proceed from the shore, they can form no Magazines in this Country, &c."—This is an argument against their ever attempting to penetrate.

7th. "They cannot send Detachments, or deviate from the Great Road."—Certainly not, without large Flanking Parties; of which they cannot be ignorant.

Mr. *Ll*— then proceeds to condemn our manner of drawing up our Regiments, three deep; and, in defiance of the united opinion of all the Powers in *Europe*, advises a fourth, with a Pike twelve feet long; which method, he says, would be a great addition to our strength."

I think with Mr. *Ll*—, that his Pike would, against Cavalry, be very formidable; but his notion of its being of use behind the Hedge-Rows, is  
a little

a little eccentric, particularly in Offensive Operations\*.

Mr. *Ll*— says, “ Let an experiment be made.”—I must confess I do not see how it is possible an experiment can be made, on such an idea, but in real action.

Mr. *Ll*—, on the Order of Battle, in his 6th Chapter, condemns the present mode of drawing up

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\* I often thought, and have mentioned it before I served in *America*, that, if every Soldier was furnished with a small Ashen Shaft, about four feet in length, on a march when a charge of Cavalry was to be apprehended, one end of the shaft having a pike to strike into the ground, and the other a hole to receive a bearded head, which may be screwed on in half a minute; and if these were planted within fifty yards distance, in the front of a Battalion, or on its flanks, as occasion might require; such an impediment would, in a great measure, contribute to throw a body of Cavalry into confusion; and if they were fired on at that juncture, they would, in my opinion, be totally routed; for a horse having received the point of one of these weapons in his body, or leg, or any other part, could not be freed from it; and the animal, continually plunging, would infallibly throw his rider.

Such instruments as those I recommend for the heads of these shafts, might also be screwed into the Branches of Trees, which, scattered in the front of Breast-works, or Redoubts, would be an almost insuperable difficulty even to Infantry, if fired on at the same time; and, had the Fruit-Trees, in the front of the Rebels' Works on *Bunker's-Hill*, been cut, and filled with these Beard-Screws, it would in all probability have proved the ruin of our Army.

I have, my Lord, some confidence in this idea, and risque it for the opinion of older Officers.

up Cavalry on the Flanks, and asks this remarkable question: "Pray, is not the Flank of Cavalry much weaker than that of Infantry?"—I should presume not, my Lord, if the Enemy have Cavalry on his Flank, and the Country be open, and the Cavalry can charge. Cavalry are of the greatest importance where the Country is open, and they can act; but they are lumber, and a burden to an Army, where they cannot act: they frequently oblige a General to quit an advantageous Camp, by exhausting a Country many weeks sooner than otherwise it would have been exhausted. At the Camp at *Warbourg*, the Forage became so scarce, that we sent thirty miles for it; and the Artillery-Horses perished, eating the picket-post for want of forage: but it was the interest of the General not to quit that Camp 'till the Enemy had made a movement he wanted them to make, or 'till it was too late in the season for them to attempt any thing more; therefore he was obliged to suffer his Cavalry to perish.

I shall only make this single observation on Mr. *Li*—'s Order of Battle. That which is an Order of Battle one day, may not be so the next. In every good disposition I have seen made, the Troops were always drawn up in conformity to the ground we occupied, or to that which was occupied by the Enemy.

If a Village is on one flank, and a River, Wood, or Morass, on the other, the Cavalry must be in  
the



centre, or on the ground where it is probable they may act, or be of use.—At *Minden*, the *French* Cavalry were in the Centre, for the reasons I have given; the *Weſer* on one flank, and a Morafs on the other: they had a Plain in their Front, and charged our Infantry; but were broke the first fire, and totally routed.

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*May the 11th, 1782.*

**T**HE Author cannot, at so alarming a period as this appears to be, give a detail of the neglected and unguarded state of our Sea-Ports; which was at first his intention: but what passed in the H—— of C—— on the 10th of *May*, convinces him that he was perfectly right in his ideas of the defenceless situation of this Country when he wrote the preceding pages. How much better it is at present, will appear from the following quotations from Speeches delivered yesterday in a certain Assembly.

Mr. Sec. *F——* said, Let the consequence be what it might, such was the present state of the Kingdom, that it was reduced to this alternative; either to remain exposed to, and unable to repel  
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Invasion,

Invasion, or to put Arms into the hands of a Loyal People, to defend every thing that is dear to them.

The L—d A——e said he could not help taking notice of the defenceless state of that Country (*Scotland*) which was exposed to be insulted all along the Coast, and plundered by the most insignificant Privateer; that *Air, Aberdeen*, and the most flourishing Towns on the Coast, might be reduced to ashes by such a Privateer, &c.

Mr. R—g—y said, this was a time when every hand, every head, ought to be united for the public safety. As to the mode of adding to the home defence, he should leave it to the Ministers, &c.

General C——y said, the state of the Army and Militia was such as it would not be prudent in him to describe; but it was known to him, that both were alarmingly deficient in Effectives. In a word, the measure proposed (arming the People) was necessary. He did not believe there was a Military Man in the Kingdom who would venture to say, that of a Force actually in the Country he could make such a repartition as would enable him to cover the different places which were liable to attacks, and some of which must be successfully defended, or the Nation would be ruined. For his part, he could make no such repartition, &c. &c.

Colonel B——é strongly urged the necessity of arming the People; for, if it should not be carried into execution, the Enemy, by being *Masters of the Sea*, would at any time have it in their power

*to ruin this Country.* The People should be convinced of this; for at present he understood that it was a common expression, "If the Enemy should land, we must make peace." But this was a mistake: for in such a case we could not be Masters of a Peace; we must depend on the Enemy for it; and they would not grant it, perhaps, till they had reduced some of our Towns to ashes, and ruined the Country by heavy contributions. Then, indeed, but not before, would they grant a peace. He said, every heart and hand in the Country should now be united; the salvation of this Country depended upon it.

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THIS may suffice to shew that the means of internal defence in this Country are unequal to the Force of the Combined Enemy.

The Author thinks, that the publication of these Speeches in all the Daily Papers evinces, that nothing here contained can have any evil tendency. He is further of opinion, that the internal defence of this Country would for ever have been equal to any emergency, had the Militia-Bill been continued without any deviation from its original plan, and had the design of the Noble Projector (Lord T——) been adhered to, and fully put in execution; which plan was, that no Man should serve longer than three years. By this time one hundred thousand Men, acquainted with the use of arms, might in that case have been  
 assen-



affembled ; but now, none but worn-out Men and old Soldiers are to be found, so qualified. The Men that should recruit the Army, are in the Militia : the Army can only be recruited by disembodiment of the Militia ; which may be done at the end of this Campaign. The greatest objection is the hardship on those who have recently found Substitutes : but this is not a difficulty without remedy ; they may be exempted from Ballot. The Associations for Substitutes (of which there are many) are not to be regarded.

The Author, finishing his Remarks here, must postpone his Observations on the neglected state of our Sea-Ports until the Autumn, when he promises to furnish your Lordship with an ample detail of all the distresses that might have befallen this Country, either from the inattention of those to whom the care of preventing it has been hitherto entrusted, or from some unknown cause.

THE END.



